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Questions 
 What are the medium and long-term drivers of conflict and instability in Bangladesh?  
 Where is conflict most likely to escalate and between which groups?  
 What are the main conflict/stability threats to Bangladesh’s transition to middle-income 
status? 
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1. Summary 
This rapid literature review examines the root causes and dynamics of conflict and (in)stability in 
Bangladesh. Key findings include: 
Conflict profile  
Bangladesh has a violent political culture, and has experienced widespread political 
violence, especially around elections – this is a feature of its increasingly authoritarian 
democracy. Political violence often sees the political, the youth and student cadre of the parties 
clash; while the targets of political violence are largely low and mid-ranking political party 
members (Hassan & Nazneen, 2017, p.206). 
Social, ethnic and religious conflicts have flared when exploited for political purpose, but 
are mostly latent (BTI, 2018, p.27). The last decade has seen a new phase of Islamic 
radicalisation and violence; increased violent targeting of minorities; the continuation of gender-
based violence; and violence against labour rights protests and human rights activists (Odhikar, 
2019). Extremist groups pose challenges to the state’s monopoly on the use of force (BTI, 2018).  
Economic profile  
Bangladesh is generally heralded as an economic development success story. It passed 
from being a low-income country (LIC) to a lower-middle-income country (LMIC) in 2015. It is 
classified as a Least Developed Country (LDC), but in its 2018 triennial review, for the first time it 
met all requirements to graduate out of LDC status. It could graduate from LDC status in 2024. 
Bangladesh’s Millennium Development Goals (MDG) achievements were remarkable, but it faces 
significant challenges to eliminating poverty and to climb further to be an upper-middle-income 
country (UMIC). 
Conflict and (in)stability – causes and actors 
Social cleavages - Bangladesh has a fairly homogenous population – being majority Bengali; 
and a majority being Muslim, with a history of harmonious social relations and strong sense of 
national identity. The most important schism is on the issue of the role of religion in politics and 
national identity. There is tradition of vocal civil society activism. 
Environmental challenges - Bangladesh is one of the world’s most disaster prone countries, 
and most at risk from climate change. 
Economic challenges and governance - To move closer to UMIC status, Bangladesh needs to 
accelerate growth to seven percent of GDP and above. Economic diversification, moving labour 
to more productive sectors, creating new sources of growth, and general productivity gains are 
key areas for improvement. Making growth more inclusive and reducing poverty by creating jobs 
and supporting rural development are key challenges. Bangladesh has achieved growth and 
poverty reduction despite having some of the worst governance and anti-corruption scores in the 
world. This is partly due to its ‘competitive clientelism’ where rent-sharing occurs across political 
divides (Hassan & Raihan, 2017, p.97). However, the main risk to economic stability is its poor 
institutional and governance landscape. 
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Political challenges – elections, political violence, and party politics - Rivalry between the 
two main political parties, the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), has 
dominated Bangladeshi politics since 1991. Election-related unrest has led to deadly political 
violence. Human rights abuses allegedly carried out by the authorities include: extrajudicial 
killings, arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, torture, beating and harassment of 
opposition groups. These have become more frequent as partisan tensions have escalated.  It 
has paralyzed civil and economic activities (BTI, 2018). Parliamentary elections in December 
2018 were marred by widespread allegations of election irregularities and political violence. 
Violence is used by the politically affiliated to gain access to economic benefits and privileges 
(BTI, 2018, p.27). Complex gendered violence also occurs around election and democratic 
processes - including psychological, economic, sexual and physical violence. 
Political settlement - Bangladeshi politics has undergone a significant transformation since its 
1971 independence, including periods of prolonged military rule (BTI, 2018). Since the flawed 
2014 election, the Awami League has essential controlled parliament, leading to further 
centralisation, partisan tendencies, and authoritarianism (BTI, 2018). It exhibits “partyarchy” and 
dynastic rule, which stymie regime succession and democratic consolidation, and fosters political 
instability as violence becomes a constitutive feature of the political settlement around regime 
succession (Hassan & Nazneen, 2017). The key schism in Bangladeshi politics is the divide 
between those that see national identity as tightly related to religion (Islam), and the other side 
that see national identity as tied to ethnicity and use of the Bengali language (Rahman, 2019, 
p.173; BTI, 2018). Elites drive this polarising divide with their competing views of the foundation 
myth of the nation, but not on ethnic or socioeconomic divisions (Rahman, 2019, p.173).  
Yet despite Bangladesh’s divided and contentious party politics, both parties have exhibited 
strong commitment to a long-term development agenda, with remarkable economic and 
development outcomes, relative to the region (World Bank, 2016, 2018). Public support for 
democratic governance is high.  
Justice and corruption - The realities and perceptions of injustice in the criminal justice system, 
and human rights violations, are fuelling distrust in the police and judicial system. This includes 
the lack of implementation of laws, impunity of law enforcement agencies and corruption. Law 
and order problems are compounded by corruption.  
The Rohingya crisis - Bangladesh now hosts nearly one million Rohingya refugees. The 
refugees live in hastily built and severely overcrowded camps, and humanitarian and Bangladesh 
government aid agencies are severely strained (e.g. with healthcare and education gaps). 
Extreme overcrowding particularly affects health, vulnerability to environmental shocks, and 
women and girls. The natural environment is under pressure - especially fragile forest and land 
resources - and the camps face significant risks from floods and landslides during the monsoon 
season.  
Bangladeshis are broadly supportive of the government’s decision to allow Rohingya refugees 
into the country. However, the crisis has already put an immense strain on the half a million 
Bangladeshis who live in the Cox’s Bazar District, with rising tensions with host communities 
(Loy, 2019). While the Bangladeshi macro-economy has shown resilience to ongoing 
accommodation of the refugees, without resolution, the situation threatens to deepen as a 
protracted and multi-dimensional crisis (World Bank, 2018. p.25). The Bangladeshi government 
has kept its borders open, and provided humanitarian aid with generous support from 
humanitarian agencies; however, its stance is that the Rohingya must return to Myanmar (World 
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Bank, 2018. p.25). This has meant it has limited initiatives that might integrate the Rohingya. The 
Rohingya crisis could upset the secular/religious balance in Bangladeshi politics. 
Extremism - A contemporary phase of violent extremism in Bangladesh occurred from 2013-
2017, and saw the brutal murders of a number of secular bloggers, liberal academics and 
lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual (LGBT) activists. These attacks, and the more widespread 
threats against religious minorities and secular actors, can be seen as a trend towards the 
“Islamization of public life”. The groups responsible for current extremism include: Jamaat-ul-
Mujahideen (JMB), Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), affiliates of Al-Qaeda in the Indian 
Subcontinent (AQIS) and Islamic State (ISIS). The literature identifies political drivers of this 
violence as: long-standing rivalry between the Awami League and the BNP, especially the 
targeting of BNP ally Jamaat-e-Islami. Additional drivers include: the authorities’ repression, 
human rights violations, heavy-handed responses to dissent, and long-standing problems of 
weak governance and corruption. Domestic drivers are most significant. However, there are 
some international drivers – e.g. the presence of transnational terrorist groups such as ISIS and 
AQIS (Idris, 2017a). The new armed Rohingya insurgency on the Bangladeshi-Myanmar border 
could become important (IPAC, 2017, p.2).  
Chittagong Hill Tracts conflict - The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) indigenous community 
continue to experience widespread discrimination, and violence and abuse. This is portrayed as 
a law and order problem rather than a political problem (BTI, 2018, p.31). 
The Bangladesh-India border - Border disputes over recent decades have seen cross-border 
skirmishes and killings between or by the border security agencies (Bhardwaj, 2016). Despite a 
2015 agreement between the Bangladeshi and Indian governments, the Indian Border Security 
Force (BSF) are accused of continuing to violate human rights in the region (Odhikar, 2019). 
Literature base 
This paper is based on a rapid literature review, and is thus illustrative of the key issues 
and is not comprehensive of every issue. There is a lot of literature that explores the many 
different issues that contribute to conflict, political violence and (in)stability in Bangladesh across 
academic, think tank, policy and practitioner sources.  
This query draws on the concepts of “conflict analysis” within international development 
policy and practitioner literature, and the DFID, FCO & MOD definition of "stability”. This 
paper understands “conflict analysis” as a structured process of analysis to understand conflict 
that focuses on the conflict profile, the actors involved and their perspectives, the causes of 
conflict, and the dynamics of how these elements interact (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2012; 
Herbert, 2017). It understands stability as: ‘characterised in terms of political systems which are 
representative and legitimate, capable of managing conflict and change peacefully, and societies 
in which human rights and rule of law are respected, basic needs are met, security established 
and opportunities for social and economic development are open to all’ (DFID, FCO & MOD, 
2011, p.5). 
2. Conflict profile  
Bangladesh has a violent political culture, and has experienced widespread political 
violence, especially around elections – this is a feature of its increasingly authoritarian 
democracy. This type of violence, and political instability, dates back to independence in 1971, 
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with historic fluctuations, and is centred around the key divide between the two main political 
parties and competition for political office (Midgley, 2018). ‘Politically motivated strikes and 
blockades – or hartals as they are known locally – are all too common, especially around 
elections’ (Midgley, 2018). Figure 1 shows peaks of conflict events around elections – with 
Parliamentary elections in December 2018 and January 2014 seeing huge spikes in the number 
of riots, increases in the number of protests and an increase in violence against civilians around 
December 2018. The contested 2014 elections led to the 2015 political crisis (see Section 4), 
with a huge spike in riots, and an increase in protests (relative to the level in the period before). 
Figure 1: Conflict events in Bangladesh 2010-20191 
 
Source: ACLED, 2019a 
 
 
                                                   
1 Figures 1 and 2 present graphics of conflict events from ACLED (2019a) based on its dataset - which is publicly 
available at https://www.acleddata.com/data/. ACLED tracks reported political violence from four main types of 
sources (ACLED, 2019b, p.33): (1) Local, regional, national and continental media reviewed on a daily basis; (2) 
Reports from NGOs or international organisations used to supplement media reporting; (3) Selected social media 
accounts, including Twitter and Telegram; and (4) Information and data provided through partnerships with local 
conflict observatories in hard-to-access cases. The ACLED (2019b, p.6) codebook explains its methodology in 
further depth and that this data has its limitations – e.g. biases in the media coverage are not corrected for, and 
hard to reach areas are less covered. ACLED’s fundamental unit of observation is the “event”. ‘Events involve 
designated actors – e.g. a named rebel group, a militia or state forces. They occur at a specific named location 
(identified by name and geographic coordinates) and on a specific day… ACLED currently codes for six types of 
events and twenty-five types of sub-events, both violent and non-violent, that may occur during a period of 
political violence and disorder’ (ACLED, 2019b, p.6). The six types of events are: battles, explosions/remote 
violence, violence against civilians, protests, riots and strategic developments.  
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Figure 2: Actors by event frequency 
 
Source: ACLED, 2019a  
Political violence in Bangladesh usually: involves armed clashes between the political, the 
youth and student cadre of the parties; and targets largely low and mid-ranking political 
party members. Both parties have used general strikes and transport blockades for political 
gain, when in opposition. The ruling party has also used police and security agencies to arrest 
and harass opposition party activists and leaders. (Hassan & Nazneen, 2017, p.206).  
‘Social, ethnic and religious conflicts are mostly latent in Bangladesh and have flared only 
when exploited for political purpose’ (BTI, 2018, p.27). Examples of this include: violence 
against religious and LGBT minorities; violence against secular actors; gender-based violence 
(e.g. rape, sexual harassment, dowry related and domestic violence – this can also be related to 
party political violence); and violence against labour rights protests and human rights activists 
(Odhikar, 2019). While the state generally has a monopoly on the use of force across the 
country, this has been challenged by extremist groups (BTI, 2018).  
Section 4 explores the main challenges and actors related to conflict and (in)stability. 
3. Economic profile  
Bangladesh is generally heralded as an economic development success story, compared 
to most other South Asian economies. Its economic performance is ‘quite strong’ with growth of 
6.3% per year since 2007; it has experienced stable exchange rates; and benefits from a steady 
flow of remittances (BTI, 2018; Midgley, 2018; Asia Development Bank (ADB), 2016; 
Bhattacharya, 2018). Bangladesh has seen a rapid rise in its GNI per capita, particularly since 
2002 (see Figure 3). Its most recent Gross National Income (GNI) was measured at USD$1,470 
in 2017 (World Development Indictors, World Bank).  
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Bangladesh passed from being a low-income country (LIC) to a lower-middle-income 
country (LMIC) in 2015 (Risse, 2018), as the LMIC classification is for countries that have GNI’s 
per capita within the range of: USD$1,006-$3,955 (according to the most recent OECD-DAC’s 
list of ODA recipients, which is updated every three years).2 However, while meeting the LMIC 
GNI requirement, Bangladesh is actually classified as a Least Developed Country (LDC), a 
category that supersedes the LMIC category, and that is based on GNI per capita and also the 
human assets index (HAI) and economic vulnerability index (EVI). 
Bangladesh is classified as a LDC, but in its 2018 triennial review, for the first time it met 
all requirements to graduate out of LDC status (UN/DESA, 2018). This means it could 
graduate in 2024, if it maintains its rankings on the criteria (Risse, 2018). This would be a 
significant achievement, comparatively only five LDCs have graduated since 1971 (Botswana, 
Cabo Verde, Equatorial Guinea, the Maldives, and Samoa) (Risse, 2018). 
Figure 3: Bangladesh’s GNI per capita (Atlas method (current US$)) from 1973 to 2017 
 
Source: World Development Indicators database, World Bank, accessed 13/05/2019.3  
Bangladesh performed ‘spectacularly’ in progress towards the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG) goals, but poverty continues to be a major problem (BTI, 2018). Achievements 
include: halving poverty (falling from 59 percent in 1991-92 to 25 percent in 2015); narrowing the 
gender gap; significant progress in access to health and basic social services; falling fertility and 
maternal mortality rates; increased gender equity in primary and secondary schools; and 
improvements in child immunisation and life expectancy (World Bank, 2016, p.i; BTI, 2018; 
Bhattacharya, 2018). Important drivers of poverty reduction are: increases in labour income, 
                                                   
2 http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-
standards/DAC_List_ODA_Recipients2018to2020_flows_En.pdf  
3 The World Bank data is based on World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. 
License : CC BY-4.0. 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?end=2017&locations=BD&start=1973&view=chart  
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agricultural productivity, female labour force participation, and remittance transfers (World Bank, 
2016, p.i). 
Bangladesh ‘is on the middle-income highway’ however, it faces significant challenges to 
eliminating poverty and to climb further to be an UMIC (World Bank, 2018, p.18; World Bank, 
2016). Section 4 explores the main challenges to economic stability and development. 
4. Conflict and (in)stability – causes and actors 
Social cleavages and challenges 
Bangladesh has a fairly homogenous population – being majority Bengali; and a majority 
being Muslim (90 percent of the population), with a minority of Hindus (around 9 percent), and a 
small number of Christians and other religions and ethnic minorities (World Bank, 2016, p.1). 
Thus, ethnic conflict has not been a feature, instead the norm has been harmonious social 
relations with strong cultural bonds and national identity.  
The most important schism is on the issue of the role of religion in politics and national 
identity (the “foundation myth of the nation”) – with one side seeing national identity tightly 
related to religion (Islam), and the other side seeing national identity as tied to ethnicity and use 
of the Bengali language (Rahman, 2019, p.173; BTI, 2018). This division has been contended 
since independence, and has become more polarised, particularly since 2010 and 2013 
(Rahman, 2019; BTI, 2018). See below for more on this. More generally, Bangladesh has 
become a much more religious society and Bangladeshis have become more confident and 
comfortable expressing their Islamic identity (manifested in their dress and forms of speaking) 
(Idris, 2017a).  
Civil society 
Bangladesh has a tradition of a vocal and active civil society, however civil society space 
is closing (BTI, 2018). In terms of the CSO landscape, BTI (2018) explains that: 
 Several ‘self-help’ groups are active on governance, culture and gender issues.  
 Many large development NGOs participate in generating awareness about government 
policies, likely impacts, and mobilising public opinion against discriminatory laws 
 In the recent past, civil society groups rallied public opinion against terrorism, religious 
fundamentalism and against attacks on minorities.  
 Civil society activism helps in educating and mobilising public opinion in an organised 
way  
There appears to be around 250,000 civil society organizations,4 however, only 50,000 are 
thought active (BTI, 2018).  
The government is increasing its scrutiny and control over CSOs and the media through 
laws and other measures (e.g. the new Digital Security Act) (Civicus, 2018). The conditions for 
                                                   
4 For a list of local organisations working on conflict and peacebuilding in Bangladesh, see - 
https://www.peaceinsight.org/conflicts/bangladesh/  
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human rights defenders and journalists are very bad, and appear to be worsening. Civicus (2018)  
describes the government as launching a ‘systemic assault on civic freedoms’. 
Environmental challenges 
Bangladesh is one of the world’s most disaster prone countries (World Bank, 2018b). It is 
located along the Ganges-Brahmaputra Delta, and with a population of 160 million, it is the 
world’s most densely populated delta (ibid). ‘More than 80 percent of the population is potentially 
exposed to floods, earthquakes and droughts, and more than 70 percent to cyclones. On 
average, the country experiences severe tropical cyclone every three years, and about 25 
percent of the land mass is inundated with flood waters every year. Severe flooding occurs every 
4-5 years and covers 60 percent of the land mass’ (ibid). The Rohingya refugee camps face 
particularly acute risks of monsoon floods and landslides (World Bank, 2018, p.25). Notably, the 
economy showed resilience to repeated flooding in 2017 (ibid). However, unfavourable weather 
conditions could slow poverty reduction further among agricultural households (ibid). This is 
significant as ‘agriculture provides nearly half of all employment and supports over 70% of the 
population’ (ADB, 2016, p.9). 
It is also one of the countries most at risk from climate change due to its location in a river 
delta with low-lying floodplains, as identified by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(ADB, 2016, p.4). Projected ‘changing rainfall and water flow patterns—coupled with prevailing 
poverty, high population density, and reliance on livelihoods that are weather sensitive—can 
affect food security, rural livelihoods, public health, and access to infrastructure and social 
services’ (ADB, 2016, p.4). ADB (2016) identify reducing vulnerabilities to environmental 
degradation and climate change as one of five key challenges for Bangladesh. 
Economic challenges 
To move closer to UMIC status, Bangladesh needs to accelerate growth to seven percent 
GDP and above (ADB, 2016). Economic diversification, moving labour to more productive 
sectors, creating new sources of growth, and general productivity gains are key areas for 
improvement (ADB, 2016). However, this is also an area where Bangladesh has made less 
progress (Moazzem & Arno in Bhattacharya, 2018). E.g. the agricultural sector is the biggest 
employer (44 percent in 2015), but a relatively lower contributor to GDP (making up 16 percent of 
GDP), and from 1995-6 to 2015 the share of employment decreased only by 7 percent (ibid). 
Conversely, the average level of growth in the share of labour in the industrial sector was only 
0.4 percent a year (increasing by 7 percent from 1995-6 to 2015) (ibid). 
Making growth more inclusive and reducing poverty by creating jobs and supporting rural 
development are key challenges (ADB, 2016). While GDP and GNI have improved, and there 
has been a general decline in inequality, inequality in rural areas has remained more or less 
unchanged between 2000 and 2010 (World Bank, 2016, p.i). As 70 percent of the population live 
in rural areas, this is significant (ibid). Even if its economy continued to grow as rapidly as it has 
since 2000, the poverty rate would only fall to 15-20 percent by 2030, still short of the goal of 
eliminating extreme poverty by 2030 (ibid). 
The main risk to economic stability is widely identified as Bangladesh’s poor institutional 
and governance landscape (e.g. World Bank, 2018, p.18-22). While the main risk related to 
conflict is the social and economic risks of the Rohingya refugee crisis, especially if it continues 
and becomes a protracted crisis, finds the World Bank (2018, p.25).  
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Governance  
Bangladesh has had a paradoxically successful economy, despite having some of the 
worst governance and anti-corruption scores in the world (the so called ‘Bangladesh 
paradox’) (Khan, 2017, p.3; Bhattacharya, 2018). Economic factors that have contributed to this 
include: the growth of the labour-intensive garments and textiles sector, growth of remittances, 
stable growth in agriculture, and Official Development Assistance (ODA) inflows (Khan, 2017, 
p.3). Underpinning this was the development of ‘competitive clientelism’ in the 1990s, where rent-
sharing occurred across political divides (Hassan & Raihan, 2017, p.97). The largely ordered 
deals (rather than disordered), provided investors with certainty that the deals would be 
delivered, thus creating a stable environment for investment (ibid, p.28). However, the cost was 
high levels of corruption (Khan, 2017, p.3). 
‘This pattern of growth is unlikely to continue without limit as rapid productivity growth 
has to be achieved and political stability has also been challenged by the re-emergence of 
single party rule after the controversial 2014 elections. The current governance arrangements 
are inadequate for meeting these challenges’, finds Khan (2017, p.3). The ADB (2016) identify 
increasing transparency and accountability by addressing institutional and policy weaknesses as 
one of five key economic challenges (ADB, 2016). The World Bank (2018) highlights that the 
focus on elections weakened the chances of domestic governance reforms  
Political challenges  
Elections, political violence, and party politics  
Two political parties, the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), have 
dominated Bangladeshi politics since the 1991 return to electoral democracy (World Bank, 
2016, p.1). Rivalry between the two leaders - the current Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, and 
opposition leader Khaleda Zia - is often at the root of its dysfunctional democracy (BTI, 2018). 
Power alternated between the two parties in the 1990s and 2000s, and since 2009, the Awami 
League has held power, winning a third term in the contested December 2018 election. Despite 
its challenges – coups, periods of military control, and election irregularities - it is one of the ‘most 
stable democracies in South Asia’, according to Rachman (2019, p.174). 
Election-related unrest has led to deadly political violence - with spikes in riots, long periods 
of general strikes (hartals) and transport blockades around elections, as Figure 1 above shows 
(World Bank, 2016, p.1). E.g., more than 500 people died around the 2014 elections, and 100 
died following the 2015 anniversary of the 2014 elections (World Bank, 2016, p.1). At least 17 
people died over the 2018 election period.5 Related human rights abuses allegedly carried out by 
the authorities include: extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, torture, 
beating and harassment of opposition groups. These have become more frequent as tensions 
with the BNP have escalated; opposition leaders and activists constitute a significant proportion 
of the victims of such abuses (ICG, 2016, p.10-11). ICG (2016) notes that the government 
appears bent on using law enforcement machinery to silence legitimate dissent and criticism. 
                                                   
5 See - https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bangladesh-politics/bangladesh-opposition-boycotts-oath-calls-for-
new-election-idUSKCN1OX0D7  
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Election violence has resulted in an ‘ever-deepening sense of disillusionment with state 
structures and institutions that fail to prevent these disturbances’ (Midgley, 2018) 
It has also ‘often paralyzed civil and economic activities’ – e.g. the 2015 wave of political 
violence caused heavy economic loses – this includes the election related violence, and also 
violence committed by the Islamists (BTI, 2018). Overall, it is estimated to have cost Bangladesh 
US$ 2.2 billion (or about one percent of GDP) (World Bank, 2016, p.1). Daily economic losses to 
industrial sectors were estimated at: Bangladeshi taka (BDT)6 8.4 billion (for the garment 
industry); BDT 3 billion (transport); BDT 1 billion (manufacturing sector); BDT 2.9 billion 
(agriculture); BDT 2.5 billion (real estate); and BDT 2.1 billion (tourism) (BTI, 2018, p.3).  
Parliamentary elections in December 2018 were marred by widespread allegations of 
election irregularities and political violence – including stuffed ballot boxes, casting fake 
votes, voters being forced to vote for the ruling party candidates, ‘capturing’ polling centres, 
arrests, forcibly ousting of polling agents and voter intimidation (Odhikar, 2019). ‘International 
election monitors were not issued accreditation and visas within the timeframe necessary to 
conduct a credible international monitoring mission’ (US Department of State, 2018). There was 
a rapid escalation of political violence in December 2018 as the election campaign intensified, 
including: arrests, widespread surveillance, and a crackdown on free speech (HRW, 2018). 
Thousands of people were arrested for making critical comments of the government and for other 
allegedly spurious reasons, including senior members of main opposition parties, and opposition 
activists. E.g., BNP leader Khaleda Zia, was convicted and jailed in February 2018 on corruption 
charges (HRW, 2019). The BNP has boycotted elections in 2014 and 2019 due to what it 
identifies as systematic election fraud.  
There are strong links between political affiliation and economic benefits through 
patronage, and violence is used to control resources (BTI, 2018). The competition within the 
Awami League has also escalated, e.g. with violence used at the local level to gain roles in the 
party. Meanwhile, in some places, religious cleavages are exploited to perpetuate influence, and 
planned attacks by groups with connections to the government are conducted to make political 
points or grab properties’ (BTI, 2018, p.27). 
Complex gendered violence also occurs around election and democratic processes - 
including psychological, economic, sexual and physical violence, finds a study based on 
focus groups (Paasilinna, et al, 2017). Women’s political participation is limited by the fear of 
political attacks, prompting some families to limit their participation. Women candidates, political 
activists and voters have faced harassment, assault and intimidation. And some women are 
perpetrators of electoral violence through carrying out intimidation within the home, and 
slandering candidates in the public sphere. The focus group participants identified systemic 
sources of electoral violence as: (1) patriarchal cultural norms and interpretation of religion; (2) 
Bangladesh’s violent political culture; and (3) weak implementation of laws (ibid). 
                                                   
6 To put this into context, in January 2015 the BDT to USD conversion rate was 78.21 (data extracted via 
https://freecurrencyrates.com/en/exchange-rate-history/USD-BDT/2015/cbm on 13 May 2019). 
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Political settlement 
Bangladeshi politics has undergone a significant transformation since its 1971 
independence, including periods of prolonged military rule (BTI, 2018). Its political 
settlement has evolved in four phases, explains Khan (2017, p.22-23): 
(1) 1971-1975 – over this period the Awami League moved from being a dominant party 
(initially inclusive of almost all major political forces in the country) to a vulnerable 
authoritarian party (where it failed to manage internal political competition and attempted 
to create a one-party state). This ended with the then President’s assassination by 
disgruntled army officers. 
(2) 1975-1990 – this period ‘saw a managed return to multi-party politics under parties led by 
ex-military rulers. This was a hybrid period, with characteristics of both vulnerable 
authoritarianism and competitive clientelism’. 
(3) 1990-2006 – this period of ‘competitive clientelism’ saw all-powerful political factions 
have a reasonable chance of getting to power and accessing political rents. Political 
predictability led to improvements in private investment. ‘High levels of corruption and 
apparently weak governance coexisted with high levels of private investment, export 
growth and accelerating growth rates’ 
(4) 2008-2017 – with the election of the Awami League government, there has been an 
‘evolution of the political settlement away from competitive clientelism towards an 
effective one-party system’. This is a system between competitive clientelism and 
vulnerable authoritarianism, ‘where a ruling coalition stays in power by enforcing electoral 
rules of its own choice and restricting the organisational freedoms of the opposition’. 
The move to a dominant party system has further intensified since the December 2018 
election. A dominant party system is one that has successively secured election victories and 
whose defeat is unlikely for the foreseeable future (Hassan, 2019). Hassan (2019) identifies five 
broader features of the state and politics in Bangladesh: 
 Partyarchy – the political parties de facto monopolise political process, state institutions, 
civil society)  
 The major parties are catchall – as they represents all classes and social groups 
 There is a de facto party-state as: the lines between the state and the party are blurred; 
and as the ruling party’s de facto partyarchal has a monopoly over state agencies, 
constitutional bodies and vast sections of the of the civil society associations. And de 
facto power is concentrated in one supreme leader 
 There is a high degree of personalism pervading state, politics, private sector and civil 
society 
 A recent consolidation of dominant party system 
Figure 4 depicts these four phases according to political settlements theory – the dotted lines 
indicate possible scenarios from 2017 (Khan, 2017). 
Figure 4: The evolution of the political settlement in Bangladesh 1971–2017 
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Source: Khan (2017, p.22). 
Since the flawed 2014 election, the Awami League – and specifically the Office of the 
Prime Minister - has essentially controlled parliament, leading to further centralisation, 
partisan tendencies, and authoritarianism (BTI, 2018; US Department of State, 2018). This 
control continues through to the bureaucracy (which is highly politicised), and local governance 
institutions (especially following the introduction of political parties in the chairman election (BTI, 
2018, p.12).  
Bangladesh is now exhibiting “partyarchy” and dynastic rule, which stymie regime 
succession and democratic consolidation, and fosters political instability (Hassan & 
Nazneen, 2017). “Partyarchy” is a political institutional form, whereby ‘political parties monopolise 
the formal political process and politicise society along party lines’ (Coppedge cited in Hassan & 
Nazneen, 2017, p.206). Hassan and Nazneen (2017) argue that: 
‘alternating partyarchal domination between the two major parties allows the ruling elites 
to instrumentally use the state agencies to suppress political opposition and extend their 
tenure in power. It also leaves little space for the opposition to use any alternative means 
but violence to contest the terms of the elite settlement around regime 
succession…[therefore] the use of violence becomes a constitutive feature of the political 
settlement around regime succession’. 
The key schism in Bangladeshi politics is the divide between those that see national 
identity as tightly related to religion (Islam), and the other side that see national identity as 
tied to ethnicity and use of the Bengali language (Rahman, 2019, p.173; BTI, 2018). The 
polarisation of this divide is ‘elite-driven, hinging mostly on competing views of the foundation 
myth of the nation’, not on ethnic or socioeconomic divisions (Rahman, 2019, p.173). It has 
evolved from being an ideological divide, to also encompassing political and societal polarisation 
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(ibid). Rathman (2019) finds one of the drivers of this polarisation in Bangladesh’s 
underdeveloped party system. 
This schism is reflected in Bangladesh’s constitutional history (BTI, 2018, p.6). In the 1972 
constitution, Bangladesh was declared a secular country based on Bengali nationalist identity. 
After the 1977 coup, a constitution amendment changed this to Bangladeshi nationalism with an 
emphasis on Islamic identity. In 1988, Islam was declared a state religion, excluding more than 
12% of Hindu minorities from the concept of nation-state; and the 2011 constitutional amendment 
restored the secular constitution, but kept Islam as the state religion (ibid). Militant Islamists 
continue to question the basis of the nation-state and its identity (ibid).  
Yet despite Bangladesh’s divided and contentious party politics, both parties have 
exhibited strong commitment to a long-term development agenda, with significant economic 
and development outcomes, relative to the region (World Bank, 2016, 2018). Successive 
governments have maintained ‘macroeconomic stability, and made efforts to liberalise trade, 
reform the financial sector and limit interference in business’ (World Bank, 2016, p.1).   
Public and civil society support for democratic governance is also strong and they vote in 
large numbers (BTI, 2018; World Bank, 2018; Rachman, 2019). However, it appears that elites, 
despite their pro-democratic rhetoric, appear to have ‘a rather instrumental understanding of 
democratic procedures and do not accept core democratic principles’ (BTI, 2018, p.12). 
Justice and corruption  
The realities and perceptions of injustice in the criminal justice system, and human rights 
violations, are fuelling distrust in the police and judicial system (BTI, 2018). This includes 
the lack of implementation of laws, impunity of law enforcement agencies and corruption (ICG, 
2016, Odhikar, 2019). E.g., nearly half of the women and children became victims of harassment 
in the police station at the time of filing rape cases (Odhikar, 2019, p.34). As a result, ordinary 
citizens resort to the tendency of taking the law into their own hands, e.g. public lynching has 
increased (ibid). Injustices in the criminal justice system are also creating grievances and thus 
opportunities for extremist groups (ICG, 2016, p. i-ii). E.g., ‘Politicising the police and using elite 
forces, particularly the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), to silence political dissent, are laying the 
seeds of future violence’ (ICG, 2016). 
Law and order problems in Bangladesh are compounded by corruption. Khan (2017) warns 
that far-right populists and violent extremists are making inroads amidst growing public concern 
over corruption and political kleptocracy. The situation in Bangladesh has improved from the 
period 2001-2005 when it was ranked the most corrupt country in the world, but corruption 
remains a big problem (USAID, 2012, p.5). ‘Average Bangladeshis resent how bureaucrats and 
government officials swindle the state and how a culture of impunity disallows citizens from 
seeking redress to legitimate grievances’ (ibid). This resentment can be another driver of 
extremism (Idris, 2017a). 
The line between organised crime and politics can be thin, as is demonstrated by the 
ruling political party and police taking direct control over the activities of urban gangsters 
(e.g. extortion, controlling illegal businesses and mediating access to services) (Jackman, 
2018). 
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The Rohingya crisis 
There are an estimated 3.5 million Rohingya worldwide, they are an ethnic Muslim 
minority practicing a Sufi form of Sunni Islam. Pre-August 2017, an estimated one million 
Rohingya resided in Rakhine State in Myanmar.7 Myanmar’s discriminatory and violent practices 
towards the Rohingya date back to the 1970s and have led to the displacement of hundreds of 
thousands – mostly to Bangladesh, and also to Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand.8  
Bangladesh now hosts nearly 1 million Rohingya refugees, following the August 2017 
wave of violence and genocide against them in Myanmar, and from previous waves of 
displacement from the 1990s onwards. An estimated 300,000 Rohingya refugees were in 
Bangladesh in 2013, this decreased to 210,000 in 2017, prior to the recent wave; and 700,000 
have arrived since August 2017 (World Bank, 2018. p.25). The deportation of Rohingya people 
from India between December 2018 and 16 January 2019 saw an estimated 1,300 Rohingya 
refugees arrive in Bangladesh (Odhikar, 2019). The refugees are concentrated in two Upazilas of 
Cox’s Bazar District: Ukhia and Teknaf.  
The refugees live in hastily built and severely overcrowded camps, and humanitarian and 
Bangladesh government aid agencies are severely strained (HRW, 2019). Some of the 
biggest challenges to human development and security in the camps are: healthcare gaps; 
overcrowding; unmet needs and restrictions on women and girls; gaps and restrictions around 
education; rising tensions with host communities; funding gaps; high pressure on the 
environment and services; and camp vulnerability to floods and monsoons (Loy, 2019; World 
Bank, 2018). 
Healthcare gaps have emerged as medical care needs have shifted from emergency care 
for bullet and knife wounds, mass vaccinations and clean water to longer-term needs (Loy, 
2019). Major gaps in service include: treatment for chronic diseases; care for sexual violence 
survivors; mental health and psychiatric services; treatment for non-communicable diseases, as 
well as malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV; women and girls’ health needs are “critically underserved” 
in the camps; and health facilities are unevenly distributed with some more distant settlements 
going without (ibid).  
Education gaps include more than half a million Rohingya children and young adults that 
have not had formal education since August 2017. The Bangladesh government has 
restricted formal education to limit the Rohingya’s integration, hoping they will return to Myanmar. 
Education is limited to informal classrooms for primary school only run by NGOs and community 
groups, and these groups have been slow to finalise the curriculum. Criticisms have been 
levelled at the quality of the education, the lack of long-term planning, and lack of coordinated 
advocacy to get the government to change its rules (Loy, 2019). 
Extreme overcrowding particularly affects health, vulnerability to environmental shocks 
and women and girls. An extreme lack of space in the camps (less than 10 square metres per 
person in some areas) heightens health risks from poor hygiene and sanitation, and means 
there’s not enough room for classrooms, storm shelters or comprehensive evacuation plans for 
the upcoming cyclone and monsoon season (Loy, 2019). Women and girls’ protection needs are 
‘critically underserved’ in the camps (ibid). And the lack of space particularly affects them as they 
                                                   
7 See - https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-crisis  
8 See - https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-crisis  
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are pressured to stay in their homes, which are just very small plastic shelters (ibid). 
‘International organizations alleged some Bangladeshi border guard, military, and police officials 
were involved in facilitating the trafficking of Rohingya women and children, ranging from “looking 
the other way” for bribes allowing traffickers to access Rohingya in the camps to direct 
involvement’ (US Depaertment of State, 2018, p.24). 
The environment is under pressure - especially fragile forest and land resources - and the 
camps face significant risks from floods and landslides during the monsoon season. This 
highlights the urgent need to upgrade infrastructure (World Bank, 2018. p.25). 
Bangladeshis are broadly supportive of the government’s decision to allow Rohingya 
refugees into the country (Felix-Joehnk, 2017). Massive demonstrations in support of the 
Rohingyas have been held in several cities in Bangladesh (Lintner, 2017). Grassroots campaigns 
have sprung up across the country to collect donations for the refugees: ‘there is great sympathy 
for the Rohingya’s tales of persecution and abuse in largely Buddhist Myanmar’ (Alam, 2017).  
However, the 1 million refugee population has already put an immense strain on the half a 
million Bangladeshis who live in the Cox’s Bazar District; and rising tensions with host 
communities have seen the initial support and welcome dwindle, suggest aid groups, the 
government and a survey (Loy, 2019). Some locals have seen their incomes fall, and prices rise, 
as they compete for increasingly scarce resources and services (Malley, 2018). The refugees’ 
presence could play into communal conflict or aggravate political divisions, especially around 
elections (Malley, 2018). A funding gap has meant that social cohesion interventions have been 
limited (Loy, 2019).  
While the Bangladeshi macro-economy has shown resilience to ongoing accommodation 
of the refugees, without resolution, the situation threatens to deepen as a protracted and 
multi-dimensional crisis (World Bank, 2018. p.25). Cox’s Bazaar is a traditional tourism 
destination within Bangladesh, but the refugee influx will negatively impact tourism revenue to 
the area (Cookson, 2017b). Economic losses due to the refugee crisis will be countered to some 
extent by the influx of foreign aid workers (Idris, 2017b). Ongoing refugee needs could 
undermine Bangladesh’s fiscal balance, as ‘the impact on the national budget and national 
external and domestic debt is significant’ (ibid). Humanitarian needs still outpace funding, and 
donor fatigue could increase pressure on the budget (ibid). Criticisms of the humanitarian effort 
include: a focus on short-term goals, without planning for a future when funding wanes; that local 
NGOs and aid workers have been left out of planning; and that international aid groups have not 
built skills in the local organisations (Loy, 2019). 
The Bangladeshi government has kept its borders open, and provided humanitarian aid 
with generous support from humanitarian agencies; however, its stance is that the 
Rohingya must return to Myanmar (World Bank, 2018. p.25). This has meant it has limited 
initiatives that might integrate the Rohingya (such as education), it has obstructed the 
construction of more substantial infrastructure, and it has not developed policies for the medium- 
or long-term (ibid; Malley, 2018). The Bangladesh government tried (but failed) to negotiate the 
refugees return to Myanmar, causing friction between Bangladesh and Myanmar. It almost 
forcibly returned some refugees to Myanmar, but stopped ‘almost certainly in response to 
international pressure’ (Malley, 2018), and as the Rohingya refused to go (Loy, 2019). One plan 
was to relocate 100,000 refugees to an island in the Bay of Bengal called Bhasan Char – 
however this island faces worse risks of floods and tidal surges (particularly in monsoon and 
cyclone seasons), and refugees would face even more limited livelihood opportunities and 
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freedom of movement there (HRW, 2019). Rakhine State is not safe for return (Loy, 2019), and 
given the uncertainties around repatriation, ‘the crisis impact on host communities and the rest of 
the country could intensify’ (World Bank, 2018, p.25).  
The Rohingya crisis ‘could upset the very precarious balance between secularism and 
religion in Bangladeshi politics’ (Felix-Joehnk, 2017). Hefazat-e-Islam has its headquarters in 
Chittagong, in the area of Bangladesh adjacent to Rakhine in Myanmar, from where the 
Rohingya have fled. The movement has called for the liberation of Rakhine, and has threatened 
to wage ‘jihad’ on Myanmar ‘if the army and its associates do not stop torturing the Rohingya 
Muslims’ (Felix-Joehnk, 2017). Felix-Joehnk (2017) argues that the Rohingya crisis is giving 
Hefazat-e-Islam a greater role in Bangladeshi national politics, and putting liberalism under 
threat. However, there is little evidence that Islamist political parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami are 
benefiting from the crisis.  
Extremism 
A contemporary phase of violent extremism in Bangladesh occurred from 2013-2017, and 
saw the brutal murders of a number of secular bloggers, liberal academics and LGBT 
activists. The targets have widened to include religious/other minorities - including Shias and 
Hindus – and the attacks have become more sophisticated. Bangladesh also experienced a 
period of extremist violence from 1999-2005, which was curbed by a government crackdown on 
Islamist groups (Idris, 2017a). However, both of these phases are somewhat exceptional, with 
Bangladesh more historically being a tolerant, plural, and syncretic society (Macdonald, 2016; 
BTI, 2018). 
These attacks, and the more widespread threats against religious minorities and secular 
actors, can be seen as a trend towards the ‘Islamization of public life’ in Bangladesh (BTI, 
2018, p.7). Macdonald (2016) warns it is becoming a ‘breeding ground for violent extremism’. 
The groups responsible for current extremism include: Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen (JMB), 
Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), affiliates of Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) 
and Islamic State (ISIS) (see Box 1 for more details) (Idris, 2017a). Organisations involved in 
spreading extremist Islamist ideology include Hefazat-e-Islam coalition (a loose Islamist platform, 
composed of Islamist organisations, based at 25,000 madrasshas) and Jamaat-e-Islami (ibid; 
Nazneed, 2018). JMB, the ABT and the AQIS, want to enforce their vision of an Islamic state, to 
stage an Islamic revolution and capture state power (BTI, 2018, p.31). They reject democracy 
seeing it as a Western imposition – ‘co-opting them is not a possibility’ (BTI, 2018, p.31).  
Hefazat-e-Islam have called for limits to women’s mobility, women’s interactions in the 
public sphere, and the control of women’s dress and economic participation (Nazneed, 
2018, p.195). Nazneed (2018, p.196) explains how the coalition uses binary framings of women’s 
agency and identity (e.g. ‘religious/moral/good/traditional/authentic’ versus 
‘secular/immoral/bad/modern/Western) to influence women’s rights and the interpretation of the 
relationship between Islam and women’s empowerment in Bangladesh. 
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Box 1: The main groups involved in extremism in Bangladesh 
 Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen (JMB) – formed in 1998 and banned in 2005, the group seeks 
to establish a Bangladeshi state governed by Islamic law. JMB is affiliated to ISIS, and 
has strong ties to the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) political party. 
 Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) – formed in 2007, ABT was banned in 2015. It has 
claimed responsibility for at least seven murders of liberal writers including Ahmed 
Rajib Haider. ABT reportedly has a hit list of 84 ‘atheist’ bloggers, of whom nine have 
so far been killed (ICG, 2016, p.7). Though affiliated to AQIS, it spreads both pro-ISIS 
and pro-al-Qaeda material. 
 ISIS – formally announced its presence in Bangladesh in November 2015 but is 
believed to have been trying to recruit Bangladeshis since 2014. Despite evidence of 
ISIS activity in the country, the government has repeatedly denied it has a formal 
presence, preferring to blame local groups for attacks such as that on Holey Bakery in 
2016. 
 Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) – founded in September 2014, AQIS 
seeks to wage jihad in order to establish governance by Islamic law (CEP, 2016, p.4). 
Bangladesh is one of a number of South Asian countries9 it operates in; its 
Bangladeshi branch is known as Ansar al Islam. The latter has claimed responsibility 
for the murders of several secular activists, and was banned by the government in 
2017. 
Source: Idris, 2017a 
The literature clearly identifies political drivers of this violence as: long-standing rivalry 
between the Awami League and the BNP, and the former’s determination since winning the 
2009 elections to repress all political opposition, as creating the space for extremist groups to 
flourish. Specifically, the Awami League’s targeting of BNP ally Jamaat-e-Islami has generated a 
violent backlash from Islamist groups (Fazli, 2016a; Idris, 2017a). ‘The role of Islam in 
Bangladeshi politics is highly contested and presents a focal point of past and current violence’ 
(Macdonald, 2016). 
Additional drivers include: the authorities’ repression, human rights violations, and 
heavy-handed responses to dissent (extrajudicial killings, illegal detention, torture, etc.), this 
includes actions by the specially set up force - Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) (an anti-crime and 
anti-terrorism unit in the Bangladesh Police) (ICG, 2016). The shrinking democratic and civic 
space to express this anger has prompted people to turn to extremism (Idris, 2017a). Civil 
society actors, that could counter extremist ideology, like media and human rights groups, are 
also being silenced by a government intolerant of any criticism (ibid). Long-standing problems of 
weak governance and corruption are also drivers as ‘radicalization and institutional dysfunction 
are closely connected’ as the ‘increasingly authoritarian secular state provides radical Islamists a 
compelling grievance around which to recruit and mobilize’ (Macdonald, 2016). 
The government has inadequately responded to the murders of the secular bloggers and 
activists, by: a) failing to provide protection when many reported facing death threats; b) a failing 
                                                   
9 Others are thought to be Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Burma and Kashmir (CEP, 2016: 4). 
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to condemn the murders; c) tending to blame the victims; and d) failing to capture or prosecute 
those responsible for the murders. These contribute to violent extremists believing they can act 
with impunity. The Awami League’s ‘obsession’ with crushing the BNP has led it to blame 
extremist violence on the BNP and Jamaat, undermining efforts to find the violent extremist 
groups actually responsible. It has also been reluctant to acknowledge the presence of AQIS and 
ISIS in Bangladesh. 
Domestic drivers are most significant for driving extremism, however, there are some 
international drivers – e.g. the presence of transnational terrorist groups such as ISIS and 
AQIS (Idris, 2017a). Middle East funding of madrassas and extremist groups, and the return of 
Bangladeshi workers from the Gulf who have adopted Salafist ideas there, do foster extremism, 
but such factors are less important than domestic drivers (Idris, 2017a). The perception and 
reality of Muslims being oppressed in other countries is also a driver of radical Islamist 
sentiments – e.g. in Myanmar and Palestine (Macdonald, 2016; IPAC, 2017). Links between 
Bangladeshi and Southeast Asian extremists ‘appear to be growing’, due to ISIS and large and 
increasing population movements across the region. E.g., for trade, study, the Tabligh-i-Jamaat 
missionary movement, the annual tablighi meeting “Biswa Ijtema” that occurs outside Dhaka, 
Rohingya refugees, human trafficking, and small movement of people through Hizb ut-Tahrir 
(despite it being banned in Bangladesh since 2009) (IPAC, 2017, p.2).  
The new armed Rohingya insurgency on the Bangladeshi-Myanmar border could become 
important (IPAC, 2017, p.2). The group was first called Harekat al-Yakin (Faith Movement) and 
later Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). It could attract funding from Indonesian and 
Malaysian mujahidin who ‘have long been interested in helping their persecuted brethren in 
Myanmar but have had no good channel for doing so’ (ibid). Historic links between Southeast 
Asian and Bangladesh-based extremists are almost all Rohingya-related, and in the 1980s and 
1990s were run through the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) (IPAC, 2017, p.4). 
Chittagong Hill Tracts conflict 
The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) indigenous community continue to experience 
widespread discrimination, and violence and abuse (US Department of State, 2018; BTI, 
2018). ‘The ethnic Chakmas are fighting for their land rights which is often encroached upon by 
Muslim land grabbers in collusion with the administration. Police colluded with the locals on 
attacks on the ethnic group the Santhals in November 2016 in an eviction drive. Religious and 
ethnic cleavages are exploited to deny a group’s access to state resources and very often to 
establish hegemony’, reports BTI (2018). This is despite the peace agreement signed 20 years 
ago, which has not been fully implemented, and which has provisions for local governance and 
nationwide government quotas, e.g. for participation of indigenous CHT residents in the civil 
service and higher education (US Department of State, 2018; BTI, 2018).  
‘The government portrays [the violence] as a law and order problem rather than a political 
problem. The polarization resulting from the killing of bloggers and secular activists remained 
unaddressed as the government tried to appease the Islamists in the name of protecting religious 
sentiment of the people’ (BTI, 2018, p.31). Bangladesh lacks institutional mechanism to address 
the conflict, and its ‘weak judicial structure and corrupt police do not encourage public faith in the 
justice system’ (ibid). 
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Bangladesh-India border 
Bangladesh and India have experienced border disputes in recent decades, with some 
cross-border skirmishes and killings between or by the border security agencies 
(Bhardwaj, 2016). The roots of this are in the 1947 partition of British India, where India and 
erstwhile East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), were divided creating a porous land border of 4000 
km (ibid). While the border was very porous to begin with, movement became more restricted 
over time, particularly post-9/11 as the threat and concerns around non-state actor violence 
escalated (ibid). Border policing became violent and restrictive, especially by the Indian Border 
Security Force (BSF) (ibid). At the same time, movement of people over the border increased, 
and the population density along the border increased (particularly Bangladeshis living on the 
Indian side) (ibid). 
Despite a 2015 agreement between the Bangladeshi and Indian governments, the BSF are 
accused of continuing to violate the human rights of people living and travelling along the 
border. Odhikar (2019), a Bangladesh-based human rights organisation, reports that various 
types of human rights violations, including killing and torturing of Bangladeshi citizens by the 
BSF, occurred in the first three months of 2019, and that BSF entered into Bangladesh territory 
and attacked Bangladeshi citizens there. However, this violence is not reported in other annual 
human rights reports (e.g. by the US Department of State (2018) or BTI (2018)). The 2015 
agreement saw the transfer of 162 enclaves of land between the countries, according to the 
location of the land.10 The official calculation is that this directly affected over 53,000 people.11  
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